In a small pause, I am going to write a chronicle very bland and very selective of the first two days of the XI International Congress of Kant, which opened yesterday in Pisa and ending Wednesday, May 26. For more information undoubtedly the most detailed and objective, you can consult the website of the Congress (www.kant2010.it).
The conference opened yesterday morning and, after registration and greetings of the authorities, we have witnessed in the plenary conference of Henry Allison, the uniqueness of the categorical imperative. Allison is a giant (in every sense, having regard to its height) of Kantian studies, but the conference was difficult for the use of a variety of symbols and numbers to indicate the various formulations of the categorical imperative that Kant provides in the " Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, "which, if in a written text can serve mo 'schema are difficilisse to keep in mind during a report Oral. Work
afternoon are not able to describe them carefully, for the simple reason that at that moment I was committed (in my small way) to defend the thesis of my contribution during a panel section on Ontology and Metaphysics, involving different people, including signal, only a Portuguese girl, author of a contribution very nice (and very clearly written in German) on the concepts of reflection, particularly on the concepts of matter and form. Then I happened to attend a panel devoted to another of Kant's philosophy of mathematics (where I got to hear the good contributions of Vincenzo De Risi and Luke Bellotti), moderated by Professor Mirella Capozzi, who has made me a kantista happy when he claimed in no uncertain terms that there is a problem for Kant the object (realism vs. idealism, etc.). but a problem of objectivity of knowledge, that is, those rules (operational) that allow two or more people agree and agree upon a concept (in other words, I know objectively what the concept x when I can set up an operation similar to it which makes it usable by anyone).
the evening, after a good dinner (buffet) and some comments on the game's importance, there was another plenary session to hear what is probably the most famous living philosopher John Searle (although my Friends tell me it hegelofili more famous Robert Brandom, who will be the Congress in the coming days). Searle's conference was very pleasant, but he left little doubt, that perhaps I will talk soon. I will only add that today there was even a (unexpected) comparison between Searle and Maurizio Ferraris on the theme of "social objects", which, however, I did not attend in person (I limit myself, therefore, to report the news).
The whole day was opened by the beautiful Remi Brague conference on "Kant and the gnostic temptation." I wonder if Brague was aware that the same term was used by Gadamer to characterize the claim of Hegel's answer to the religion in his philosophical system, but the meaning is different, because Brague correctly concluded that Kant avoids Gnosticism (so its still only a 'temptation') because his philosophy is not a negation of the material world and the finite size. Brague quoted a passage from the "Critique of Practical Reason," but it was quite possible to quote the famous image of the dove that flies only because of air resistance (and not despite it). The next conference related to Kant and Habermas and the role of religion in public life. Anyone who has ever peeled Habermas knows what it is verbose and abstruse writing. Imagine the conference on Habermas (a good reason that has led myself to put out the simultaneous translation headphones, because The rapporteur spoke German very fast). Finally, Claudio La Rocca discussed the relationship between method and system in Kant, while Beatrice Longuenesse tried a parallel between Kant and Freud on the doctrine of self. On Freud did not express myself, although I agree with the comment of Wolfgang Carl, who believes the doctrine of Freud 'unsinnig' and rightly pointed out that the problem of Kant is not so much the "I" (which could well be called: principle of unity of experience), but the identity of the reference.
In the afternoon, I simply point out the reports Massimo Barale (on a comparison of Kant and the philosophy of mind of 900) and Patricia Kircher, Columbia University, on validity of arguments for transcendental apperception. Curiously, Professor Kircher also interested in Freud and wrote a famous book on the psychology of Kant. Barale, however, supported the argument that the philosophy of mind, particularly the classic functionalism and connectionism, are insufficient to account for the individual character of man, and added that a version manuals and de-trascendentalizzata Kant (such as the spread, following Strawson and Bennett, in the Anglo-Saxon literature) consists well with the classic functions, this does not apply to the real issue of transcendentalism. Unfortunately, time is running out and did not allow the continuation of report (containing the positive version of Kantianism second Barale). To combat the interpretations too analytical Kant, however, a good antidote is the beautiful volume of Allison, "Kant's Transcendental Idealism," which does justice to many misunderstandings, and to be placed on the same floor of a classic like the old (but not dated) commentary HJ Paton.
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