The third day of the Congress Kant (Monday, May 24) The conference was opened by Karl Ameriks and Alfredo Ferrarin. Ameriks focused its report on the ambiguity of Kantian cosmopolitanism, while the prof. Ferrarini (University of Pisa) put in the middle of his speech the Architecture of Pure Reason, that is a part of the Doctrine of the Method of the first Critique. The Architecture is the art of the system, but in the case of Kant's system is not given by this or that philosophy in certain way, but the reason that in itself poses its own purposes. And 'this conception of metaphysics, science as the ultimate ends of human reason, which, according Ferrarin, embodies the true concept of Kantian philosophy, and that may lead to a different key to the whole work. At Kant's moral action was dedicated to Barbara Herman, Manfred Baum and focused its attention on the relationship between freedom and law in Kant's practical philosophy.
In the afternoon, I think the most anticipated event was the report of Marcus Willascheck, perhaps the best known of kantisti generation, which has dealt with the impossibility of intuition ration in the first Critique. As usual, the undersigned was somewhere else, namely the meeting of Metaphysics and Ontology, where two young scholars, Giuseppe Motta (Mainz) and Toni Kannisto (Oslo) were at the center of their relations with the problem of how Kant, while Arnaud Pelletier discussed on '(im) possibility of defining the categories, an issue that I faced myself in my speech. The ambiguity of Kant's text, in fact, be solved if one considers that, in the second edition of the Critique of Rag. pure, Kant says that it will provide only a "Erklaerung" (explanation) of the categories and not a "Definition". A definition of the categories, the first schematic, turns into an obvious circle: because the categories are not identical to the schematic forms of the proceedings, and one can not define the forms of proceedings without them. Only the schematic, providing a category "objective reality", will enable them to be distinguished from the forms of assessment, but it is doubtful if it consists of a definition of "real" because, according to the letter of the text, only the mathematical concepts are left to define (ie, only those concepts that are resolved completely in their schematization, and this is not the case of the categories).
Tuesday, May 25 I missed the first session, it seemed very important to know if that is a Kantian "critique of reason, post-colonial" or "reason Kant has a color" (and is not a joke). Gianni Vattimo has not come, and we could not find out if the interpretation of Kant is a philosopher, and was very much appreciated the honor of Baroness O'Neill coferenza on the theme of Kantian cosmopolitanism in relation the contemporary cosmopolitanism.
The afternoon saw two parallel symposia, one on the theme of cosmopolitanism (with Thomas Pogge, Reihnard Brandt and Massimo Mori), on the other "essential ends of human reason", with Paul Guyer, Jean Ferrari and Norbert Hinske. Hinske, in particular, discussed the difference between philosophy in the cosmic sense (of which Kant speaks in the aforementioned Architecture) and in the cosmopolitan sense, but not without a turn arrow at the prof. Brandt of Marburg (and of course then the result of the two parallel symposia). The absence of Francois Marty then prevented me fi feel in the interpretation of Opus Postumum provided by Vittorio Mathieu (which fell within the section on the concept of Kantian philosophy). Much followed, however, the Nicholas De Warren report on the relationship between Husserl and Kant.
Wednesday, May 26th will be remembered as the day of the conference by Robert Brandom, but for those who (like myself) prefer to analytic philosophy transcendentalism, it will be quite beautiful on the day of the conference by Wolfgang Carl (Goettingen), dedicated to clarify the meaning of the "Copernican revolution". In fact, Carl has broadened the discussion to the explanation of the school term (which Kant uses) "form dat them guilty" and has rightly stressed the indissoluble link between form and possibilities. The Copernican revolution does not say, in fact, to determine which is the mind (or, worse, create) the object, but says it is the mind (the shape of our thinking and our sense) to constitute the very possibility of objectivity. The transcendental form is always the possibility, while the possibility is always a possibility given a priori (a finite mind of its own). Closed plenary sessions prof. Mario Caimi, winner of the Kant-Preis, who proposed a new interpretation of the chapter on the schematic. The schematic is different from the transcendental deduction justified because while the first constitution of the object in general, the second allows the application of object categories also empirical. In general, I believe that this interpretation raises more problems than it solves, but certainly part of a real problem: that of reconciling the two perspectives present within Kantianism, one for which the object (any object) is given and one for which it is a construct of the intellect (as required by the deduction). The opposition is mitigated when one considers that the deduction allows you to build the object from the formal point of view, which still requires two aspects of the experience (which corresponds to the duality postulates the possibility and the reality).
0 comments:
Post a Comment